My friends, we've got them just where we want them -John McCain during the 2008 presidential campaign, Virginia Beach, VA, October 13, 2008 (Mooney, 2008) Ask a voter during a political campaign who he or she thinks will win the election, and the answer should not be surprising. People are usually confident their candidate will win! This observation was first documented by Hayes (1936) who, in the 1932 U.S. presidential election, observed that 93% of Roose velt supporters predicted Roosevelt would win, whereas 73% of Hoover supporters predicted Hoover would win. Clearly, voters' preferences were foretelling of their electoral predic tions. Since then, links between preferences and expectations have been documented with regard to a variety of social and political events (e.g., Cantril, 1938; Granberg & Brent, 1983; Olsen, 1997) and constitute one of the most robust findings in social psychology. Electoral expectations in particular show strong links with preferences, with correlations usually exceeding .50 (see Granberg & Brent, 1983) .
What can account for this close correspondence of outcome preferences and relevant expectations? It might be tempting to conclude that people believe what they want to believe, mean ing that their rosecolored glasses prevent them from forming accurate expectations about relevant outcomes, in this case electoral ones (e.g., Babad, 1997 ). This conclusion is all the more appealing given what we know about motivated reasoning; there is overwhelming evidence that people's beliefs and conclu sions can be influenced by their motives and goals in various ways (e.g., Kunda, 1990) . Moreover, at least some laboratory research has directly implicated desirability of outcomes as a casual factor in shaping outcome expectations (e.g., Irwin, 1953) .
Although seductive, the conclusion that wishful thinking is responsible for preferenceexpectation links is unwarranted for two main reasons. First, the experimental support for desir ability bias in predictions has been somewhat elusive-it is confined mostly to outcome predictions in games of chance, and there is a lack of evidence for wishful thinking in predic tions involving more naturalistic settings (see Krizan & Wind schitl, 2007 , for a review). In short, the experimental evidence on wishful thinking seems too equivocal for one to infer that preferenceexpectation links are necessarily driven by the biasing influence of wishes or desires.
Second, there is an obvious alternative to the notion that preferenceexpectation links are formed by the causal influence of preferences. Namely, the reverse could be true: People's expectations could drive their preferences. In the political arena, there are multiple ways in which this could occur. Voters might shift their candidate preferences in order to support the candidate who is perceived most likely to win (i.e., get on the bandwagon; see Navazio, 1977; Simon, 1954) . Although voters might also shift their preferences to support the candidate perceived as the underdog (e.g., Ceci & Kain, 1982) , such a case would imply a negative relation between preferences and expectation rather than the positive one usu ally observed. Finally, people's expectations might influence their preferences outside awareness, as voters cope with the possibility of their candidate's defeat by rationalizing in advance why the unwanted candidate might not be so bad after all (see Kay, Jimenez, & Jost, 2002) . Together, this evidence indicates there are numerous ways in which expectations could influence preferences rather than only wishes and pref erences influencing expectations.
In sum, by themselves, preferenceexpectation links are insufficient to infer that wishful thinking is operating, even though such an assumption is often made. In fact, many analy ses have examined additional factors that could suggest moti vated reasoning is at work. For example, Babad (1997) demonstrated a higher preferenceexpectation link among those more strongly committed to a given candidate and lower links among those who were given monetary incentives for accurate predictions or were able to accurately report current polls. Furthermore, Dolan and Holbrook (2001) examined National Election Study data from 1984 to 1996 and showed that preferences are less predictive of expectations among those with more political knowledge, supporting their case that more accurate knowledge reduces the influence of one's wishes. Granberg and Brent (1983) examined similar national data for the elections of 1952 to 1980 and again found preference expectation links to be highest among those who were highly invested but poorly informed.
All of these findings are consistent with the wishfulthinking hypothesis and the general understanding of motivated cognition-desirability biases should be stronger among those more invested in the outcome (e.g., Krizan & Windschitl, 2007) , motivation to be accurate or accountable should reduce judgment biases (e.g., Tetlock & Kim, 1987) , and constraints of reality should pose limits on motivated distortion of judg ments (e.g., Kunda, 1990) . However, the same findings can again be explained in alternative ways that do not necessitate a causal influence of preferences. The critical problem involves the possibility that acquired knowledge about a candidate drives both preferences and expectations regarding that candi date, effectively producing preferenceexpectation links (i.e., a thirdvariable explanation; see Krizan & Windschitl, 2007) . For example, if you were a young, uncommitted voter who learned that Barack Obama was the first African American president of the Harvard Law Review (a very prestigious legal publication), it would make sense for you both to develop a more positive attitude toward him and to anticipate his chances of winning to be higher. For such reasons, studies examining political knowledge as a moderating factor should also assess knowledge content (e.g., how biased is it toward one's candi date) in addition to the amount of knowledge (cf. Dolan & Holbrook, 2001) , although this is typically not done (one rea son being the complexity involved in such measurement). Another possibility is that social influence from one's peers (e.g., friends and family) could drive both electoral prefer ences and inferences about the electorate as a whole (e.g., Fischer & Budescu, 1995) . In short, given the potential for reverse causality and thirdvariable problems, we should demand additional evidence before concluding that in a given context, preferenceexpectation links solely (or even mostly) reflect wishful thinking.
A Longitudinal Approach
An effective way to examine causality in realworld settings that at least partially mitigates these problems is to use longi tudinal (i.e., crosslagged panel) designs (see Finkel, 1995; Locascio, 1982) . Such designs increase our confidence in causal conclusions to the extent we can demonstrate one vari able to predict another at a future point in time even after con trolling for both variables at initial assessment, and we can do so over multiple assessment intervals. As mentioned before, experimental findings do provide some support for wishful thinking in predictions (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007) , but these findings speak to how variables interrelate in principle, rather than how they function in realworld settings (see Henshel, 1980) . The same can be said for the potential causal role of expectations-most research supporting bandwagon and underdog effects has been experimental (e.g., Ceci & Kain, 1982; Navazio, 1977) .
Investigators have already used longitudinal approaches to examine these causal issues. Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1948) examined 1940 national election data that included assessment of preferences (i.e., voting intentions) and expec tations (i.e., predictions of the winner) at two different time points before the election. They concluded that both causal pathways were operating; there was evidence both for wishful thinking and bandwagon effects. Granberg and Brent (1983) reexamined these findings using more appropriate analyses and reported additional data from the 1980 election that sug gested only a causal effect of preferences. However, they also used only two time points, and barring replication, the rele vance of this finding for contemporary political environments is unclear.
Purpose
To test for presence of wishful and expectationdriven effects in the 2008 U.S. presidential election, we conducted a longitu dinal investigation involving uncommitted student voters in which preferences and expectations were assessed at four dif ferent time points over 1 month before the election. Although these young adults were not necessarily representative of the general voting population, there were several key advantages of the approach we used. First, young voters are an increasingly important demographic in political elections, playing a critical role in the election of Barack Obama (Tufts University, 2008) . Second, by focusing on uncommitted voters, we were able to examine dynamics in preferences and expectations that would be difficult to capture among more typical voters whose politi cal preferences tend to be relatively fixed. Third, focusing on the month before the election enabled capturing those last shifts in opinions that typify uncommitted voters considered very important in shaping election outcomes (e.g., Fenwick, Wise man, Becker, & Heiman, 1982) . Fourth, we assessed both pref erences and expectations as continuous variables, enabling us to examine more finegrained changes in preferences or expec tations not possible with American National Election Studies data (www.electionstudies.org), where both are measured as binary variables. Finally, given that Iowa holds the first caucus in the election season, students in this state were constantly exposed to information about the election and had multiple opportunities to learn about the candidates.
We also assessed individuals' perceptions of poll results and favorability of candidates' media coverage at each time point. To the extent that preferences are found to shape expec tations over time even after taking into account perceptions of candidates' general popularity, arguments about such variables driving preferenceexpectation dynamics over time become less compelling. In addition, we examined to what extent iden tification with a preferred party might moderate wishful think ing, that is, the influence of preferences on expectations that occurs over time. Although this approach is a conceptual par allel of examining political investment as a moderating factor of preferenceexpectation links mentioned earlier (e.g., Gran berg & Brent, 1983) , in this case it would allow for a firmer test of wishful thinking given the longitudinal nature of the design. Finally, to establish the importance of changes in elec toral expectations, we tested whether these expectations uniquely predicted elation or disappointment with the election outcome after taking candidate preferences into account.
Method Participants
One hundred fiftythree students from Iowa State University served as participants. Students were encouraged to partici pate if they were interested in the election and were not fully committed to a candidate; 57% did so in exchange for $20, whereas others participated as one means to earn extra credit for a psychology course. Retention (87% at completion) was facilitated by making the full reward contingent on continued participation. All participants were recruited during Septem ber 2008.
Participants were emailed a link to an initial Web survey during early October of 2008, which they all completed before October 16. To assess basic background information, we asked participants to indicate their party affiliation (Democrat, Republican, or Independent/Other) and general political lean ings (rated on a scale ranging from 1, extremely liberal, to 7, extremely conservative). They also indicated social identifica tion with the more preferred party on a social identity measure developed by Greene (1999) . This measure requires responses to 10 statements (e.g., "This group's successes are my suc cesses" or "The limitations associated with this group apply to me also"), rated on a 4 point scale, ranging from disagree strongly, 1, to agree strongly, 4 (α = .87). Finally, participants reported their age, gender, ethnicity, and ACT score.
Participants' mean age was 21 years (SD = 2.5), and their mean ACT score was 24.7 (SD = 5.0). As is typical of college age populations in the Midwest, most individuals were Cauca sian (87%) and expressed liberal leanings (see Table 1 ). Importantly, after the election, 83% of participants indicated they had voted, with 67% of those having voted for Barack Obama.
Procedure and measures
Critical measures in the initial survey were as follows. Expec tations were assessed first with the question, "Who do you think will win the U.S. presidential election this year?" which was rated on a 7point scale ranging from definitely Barack Obama, 1, to definitely John McCain, 7, with the additional option of someone else (which no one chose). Preferences were assessed with the question, "Who will you vote for in the upcoming presidential election?" rated on a 7point scale ranging from I will definitely vote for Obama, 1, through Don't know who will I vote for, or if I will vote at all, 4, to I will definitely vote for McCain, 7. Next, to measure perceptions of can didates' general popularity-which served as covariates in the main analyses-we asked participants, "Which of the presi dential candidates do you think is currently leading in the national polls?" (response options ranged from Obama to They are tied to McCain) and "According to what you have personally experienced, how would you characterize recent (i.e., over the last week) media coverage of the presidential candidates?" which participants rated from strongly favoring Obama, 1, to strongly favoring McCain, 7.
These measures were administered via the Web again over three time points in roughly weekly intervals, with the vast majority of the responses being made during the weekends of October 18 and October 25 and after the weekend of November 1. We used partial counterbalancing to control for possible order effects. Half of the respondents first provided expectations on the first followup, with the order switched on each subsequent assessment relative to the other half of respondents. Perceptions of polls and media coverage were always assessed last. Finally, the day after the election, we assessed whether participants actually voted and asked them to rate how satisfied they were with the election result on a scale ranging from very elated, 1, to very disappointed, 7.
Analytic strategy
We used structural equation modeling by means of Mplus (Version5.0; Muthén & Muthén, 2007) to test our main hypoth eses. Specifically, we fitted a path model to the longitudinal data where (a) all repeated measures were allowed to correlate with one another at each time point, (b) all were regressed on themselves at the previous time point (i.e., stability relations), and (c) preferences and expectations were regressed on each other at the previous time point (i.e., crosslagged relations). As this model did not quite reach acceptable standards of fit, comparative fit index (CFI) < .90, rootmeansquare error of approximation (RMSEA) > .10, we examined modification indexes, which suggested that freeing a single regression path from preferences at Time 2 to preferences at Time 4 would lead to considerable improvement in model fit. The model pre sented next includes this modification. Note that none of the substantive results differed between the prespecified and the modified model.
Results

Mean-level changes
Although not the focus of the present analysis, it is also informative to consider how the overall level of people's preferences and expectations changed over time. As seen in Figure 1 , most people were aware that Obama was more likely to win and recognized that his chances improved even further as Election Day drew nearer (which was widely reported in the media at the time). However, it is also appar ent that sympathizers of both parties grew somewhat more optimistic a couple of weeks before the election, although in the case of those identified as Republicans this still meant that Obama was perceived as slightly ahead. In terms of pref erences, there did not seem to be any substantial changes over time (see Fig. 2 ). the R 2 for preferences and expectations ranged from .20 to .91. Inspection of paths in Figure 3 reveals the standard finding that electoral expectations show more fluctuations than do voting intentions, although both showed substantial stability over time. Also as would be expected, expectations tended to show higher relations with poll and media perceptions than did preferences.
Preference-expectation dynamics
There was clear evidence for wishful thinking-candidate preferences consistently predicted electoral expectations at subsequent assessment, even after taking into account previ ous expectations and perceptions of general candidate favor ability. Furthermore, these relations became stronger as Election Day approached, despite the fact that electoral expec tations became more stable.
To test whether wishful thinking was more robust among those who more strongly identified with their preferred party, we split the sample into two subsamples based on whether their average score on the social identity measure (Greene, 1999) was above the minimum scale value reflecting disagree ment regarding identification. Those scoring at this value (2.1) or higher were considered to identify highly (n = 91), whereas those scoring lower than this value were considered to identify low (n = 60). Next, using multiplegroups analyses, we fitted the same path model described earlier, with the exception of covariates (given the low sample size, we focused only on the fundamental part of the model). This model also fit the data reasonably well, χ 2 (22, N = 151) = 37.25, p = .022, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .096, 90% CI = [.036, .15], SRMR = .032. To deter mine whether party identification moderated the strength of wishful thinking, we tested an alternative model where the crosslagged wishfulthinking paths were fixed across both groups, χ 2 (25, N = 151) = 42.50, p = .016, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .096, 90% CI = [.042, .14], SRMR = .06, and then examined difference in chisquares and strengths of wishfulthinking paths. Although the inferential test did not reach significance, Δχ 2 (3, N = 151) = 5.25, p = .15, there was clear evidence for moderation. As seen in Figure 4 , crosslagged wishfulthinking paths were substantially greater among those more identified with their preferred party across the first (z = 1.90, onetailed p = .03) and third intervals (z = 1.90, onetailed p = .04), with the exception of the middle interval (z = .22). Taken together with the results from the general model including covariates, these findings support the conclusion that voter's candidate preferences biased their expectations.
Consequences of electoral expectations
To examine whether electoral expectations had unique utility in predicting reactions to the election outcome, we simultaneously regressed postelection disappointment on preferences and expectations assessed just before the election (at Time 4). As typically observed, preferences were a strong predictor of post election disappointment (β = 0.77, p < .001), such that those who favored McCain were much more likely to indicate disap pointment with the election outcome. There was also a modest tendency for expectations to exacerbate disappointment (β = 0.11, p = .07), so that those more optimistic about McCain's chances tended to experience marginally more disappointment.
Discussion
In the end, how can we account for links between electoral preferences and expectations? Experimental literature sug gests potential for multiple causal influences, but both correla tional and experimental research to date is inconclusive regarding which influences are the most powerful or the most prevalent. Among young voters that we followed over the month preceding the 2008 U.S. presidential election, there was clear support for wishful thinking-electoral preferences con sistently influenced expectations across all the three time intervals. On the other hand, there was no evidence that expec tations influenced electoral preferences. Although bandwagon, underdog, and rationalization effects have empirical support from field and laboratory experiments (e.g., Ceci & Kain, 1982; Kay et al., 2002; Navazio, 1977) , there was no evidence for these tendencies in our sample. Moreover, wishful thinking over time was obvious even after taking into account voters' perceptions of how well candidates fared in the current polls and media coverage. Although these perceptions do not exhaust all possible exogenous factors that could produce preferenceexpectation links, they do reflect important sources of information for voters. Finally, wishful thinking was espe cially likely among those who strongly identified with their preferred party. Taken together, these findings make for the most compelling case to date that electoral expectations are indeed driven by political preferences. These expectations, in turn, influence reactions to the election, so that above and beyond the influence of political preferences, optimism about the losing candidate can also exacerbate disappointment.
Implications for psychological theory
Whereas the notion that people engage in wishful thinking about the future has been largely accepted as a truism, empiri cal evidence to date has been modest. As we have argued, preferenceexpectation links in themselves are unsatisfactory evidence, and laboratory research has been limited and often confined to artificial settings (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007 ).
The present investigation produced compelling evidence for wishful thinking in a consequential, realworld setting and should thus be encouraging to researchers examining desir ability biases in forecasts. We also need to ask how candidate preferences influenced electoral expectations. On one hand, preferences might have influenced voters' expectations at the time of assessment, for example, through selective accessibility of preference consistent information or differential evaluation of favorable and unfavorable information (see Krizan & Windschitl, 2007 , for discussion of mediating mechanisms). Given the brief nature of laboratory studies, these types of accounts are gener ally considered most relevant for experimental research on desirability bias. On the other hand, in complex dynamic envi ronments such as election campaigns, it is likely that candidate preference influenced how voters chose, attended to, and remembered relevant information over time. Although it was initially thought that partisan preferences influenced relevant beliefs mainly through selective exposure to congenial infor mation, empirical evidence suggests that to be a minor factor; rather, political preferences mainly bias interpretation of infor mation (see Taber, 2003) . For example, individuals tend to hold higher standards of proof for arguments they deem unpal atable (e.g., Edwards & Smith, 1996) . In sum, it is the iterative nature of information processing in realworld environments that is likely responsible for why preferences influence expec tations over time, as voters perceive relevant information and filter it through their partisan lenses (as those more identified with their preferred party seemed to do in the current data). It will rest on future research to conduct more finegrained anal yses of such processes in realworld environments.
Implications for political behavior
Note that our results reflect the psychology of a younger group of uncommitted voters from a state (Iowa) very much informed about political campaigns. In this sense, there are clear uncer tainties about the extent to which dynamics observed here characterize the voting public in general or other young voters in particular. However, these findings do speak about political perceptions of a very important demographic (young adults; see Tufts University, 2008 ) during a critical time in an elec tion, namely that final month (e.g., Fenwick et al., 1982) . Note also that these data mirrored several patterns generally observed in national polling data-there was a clear realiza tion that Obama was more likely to win as Election Day drew nearer, and partisans generally became more optimistic regard ing their candidate regardless of which one they supported (cf. Gallup Poll, 2009) . In this sense, the sample seemed psycho logically representative of a typical young voter, also reflected in the fact that they favored Obama at about 2 to 1.
Also important was the observation that electoral expecta tions played a unique role in exacerbating disappointment with the electoral results among McCain supporters. Although this effect was modest, it suggests that campaigns' efforts to boost optimism during the final preelection weeks might have negative consequences down the line. In other words, rousing overopti mism among the candidates' supporters can exacerbate negative reactions should the candidate lose. Such reactions could have negative consequences on civic behavior, such as promoting unwillingness to support the ultimate winner or increasing disen gagement from the electoral process (cf. Tykocinski, 2001) . In sum, the results suggest that wishful thinking during elections is likely to be a doubleedged sword. Although increased optimism regarding one's candidate might motivate behavior that will help get that individual elected (a primary reason why campaigns generally foster optimism among their supporters), it also might lead to complacency before the elec tion (e.g., "my candidate will win anyway, so there is no need to vote") or negative reactions after elections that could lead to antagonism toward the elected leader (e.g., "he bought the election") or the civic process itself.
